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MONTY HIGLEY AND JONNIE 
HIGLEY, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
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RALPH L. WALKER, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. 87045)6 
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ON APPEAL FROM THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE VeNOY CHRISTOFFERSEN 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
RALPH L. WALKER 
8613 Woody Way 
Highlands Ranch, 
Appellant Pro Se 
(303) 791-8070 
Colorado 80126 
COOK & WILDE 
ROBERT H. WILDE 
6925 Union Park Center 
Suite 490 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
(801) 255-6000 
Attorney for Respondents 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MONTY HIGLEY AND JONNIE 
HIGLEY, Case No. 87045 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
vs. 
RALPH L. WALKER, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
REPLY TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
BACKGROUND 
This court granted Appellant's motion for summary reversal of 
the trial court's denial of a motion to vacate. The respondent has 
filed a petition for rehearing. 
I. 
THE RESPONDENT'S PETITION HAS NO MERIT 
The petition violates Rule 35(a) of the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure which states, •• Counsel for petitioner must certify that 
the petition is presented in good faith and not for delay." 
counsel makes no such statement. The petition has been filed for 
delay and to cause further damage to the appellant. The 
Respondent's reply to the motion for summary reversal was a one 
paragraph statement. Now after the court's ruling, counsel files 
a 29 page petition for rehearing. This after Counsel in Bankruptcy 
Court smugly admits that "the judgment entered on November 28, 1986 
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is void as to Walker." 
The petition does not shed light on any new facts or law that 
would ultimately change the court's decision. He states that the 
court can take judicial notice of the Bankruptcy proceeding to show 
lack of notice to the Higleys but doesn't want the court to notice 
the date of filing. The Respondents have not offered any other 
dates or challenged the date of filing only stated that the date 
is not a fact before this court. The date of the entry of judgment 
is also undisputed. In the Respondent's Petition on page one line 
four, he lists the date of judgment as November 28, 1986. These 
two dates are the basis for the summary reversal, the court lacked 
jurisdiction and therefore the judgment entered was void. The 
Respondents have not offered one fact or applicable law or court 
precedent that could possibly affect the outcome of this case. The 
Respondents have filed this petition to delay and cause additional 
damage to the appellant by delaying the reinstatement of the 
appellant's real estate brokers license. This petition is a 
continuation of the bad faith and fraud the respondents have 
brought on the court by dragging the bankruptcy, filed in 1986, on 
as long as possible thereby inflicting the maximum amount of time 
and pain to the appellant and his family. 
II. 
THE RECORD ON APPEAL CONTAINED THE CONTROLLING FACTS 
AND THE DATES PERTINENT TO THIS CASE HAVE NEVER BEEN DISPUTED. 
The facts that are necessary for the determination of this 
case are 1) The date of the filing of chapter 7 bankruptcy and 2) 
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the date of the entry of judgment. Both dates are included in the 
docketing statement, the motion for summary reversal, and the 
affidavit of Ralph L. Walker. The dates are part of the court 
record and certified copies are part of the affidavit. The one 
paragraph response from the respondent in opposition to the motion 
for summary reversal did not offer any other dates or claim that 
the dates were in error. The court can take judicial notice of the 
date of the entry of the judgment November 28, 1986. The filing 
of the bankruptcy was November 21, 1986, no evidence has been 
offered challenging the date of the filing and a certified copy of 
the filing is part of the court record in the affidavit of Ralph 
L. Walker. The respondents have attempted to make an issue of 
whether the Higleys received notice of the filing and whether the 
Higleys violated the automatic stay imposed by the filing of 
bankruptcy. The Higleys alleged lack of knowledge of the 
bankruptcy is irrelevant. The issue is whether the court had 
jurisdiction to enter the judgment. 
III. 
THE JUDGMENT ENTERED SIX DAYS AFTER THE FILING OF BANKRUPTCY 
IS VOID AS THE COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION. 
1. Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of all 
matters and proceedings in bankruptcy, 28 U.S.C. 1334. The state 
court has NO jurisdiction. 
In addition to the very broad grant of jurisdiction in 28 
U.S.C. 1334(a) and (b), section 1334(d) provides in particular 
that " The district court in which a case under title 11 is 
commenced or is pending shall have exclusive jurisdiction of 
all of the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of the 
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commencement of the case, and of property of the estate." The 
stay power and the automatic stay will not be limited by any 
concept of sovereign immunity. 
The power of the bankruptcy court under section 105 to enjoin 
litigation which seeks to obtain a judgement against the 
estate or to interfere with property of the debtor has been 
long recognized. Collier on Bankruptcy Paragraph 362,02 
The automatic stay imposed by the filing of bankruptcy is 
extremely broad in scope and applies to any type of formal or 
informal action against the debtor. The stay applies to all 
entities, including state courts. Subsection 362 (a)(1) of the 
bankruptcy code provides for a broad stay of litigation against 
the debtor and includes administrative, judicial, and other similar 
proceedings. Assoc, of St. Croix Condominium Owners v. St. Croix 
Hotel Corp., 682 F.2d 446. 7 C.B.C.2d 137 
The stay is effective upon the date of the filing of the 
petition and formal service of process is not required. Mueller 
v.Nugent, 184 U.S. 1,22 S. CT. (1901) , however notice was given 
both the court and the plaintiff before the trial started, later 
in the objection to the findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
and through the listings of the creditors on the appropriate 
schedules of the chapter 7 filing. 
POINT IV. 
THE JUDGEMENT ENTERED AGAINST THE DEFENDANT IS VOID 
The trial court lacked jurisdiction over the defendant after 
November 21, 1986 and therefore the entry of judgement on November 
28, 1986 was void. In Brimhall v. Meacham 27 Utah 2d 222, 494 P2d 
525 (1972) the court held that 
A judgement is void only if the court which rendered it lacked 
4 
jurisdiction of the subject matter or of the parties, or if 
it acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law. 
The court did lack jurisdiction as the defendant was under the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Bankruptcy Court. 
V. 
THE RESPONDENT'S ACTIONS AFTER ENTRY OF JUDGMENT ARE NOT 
BEFORE THIS COURT. 
The Respondents have tried to confuse the issue before this 
court by justifying their actions to collect from the recovery 
fund. The issue before this court is whether the trial court had 
jurisdiction to enter the judgment. The actions of the Respondents 
to collect from the recovery fund on a void judgment were improper. 
The respondents claim that the actions were proper because it was 
not against the appellant but against a third party. The judgment 
is void to all the world not just to Walker. The real estate 
recovery fund was not a quasi - defendant and if the judgment is 
void as to Walker how can it have any validity before the recovery 
fund. The issue is brought only to confuse the relevant issue of 
whether the trial court had jurisdiction which it clearly did not. 
VI. 
VACATION OF THE VOID JUDGMENT IS PROPER. 
In the Respondents conclusion he states ff If the judgment is 
to be voided he must follow proper procedure in the Bankruptcy 
Court." This is ludicrous. The void judgment was entered in state 
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court, a request to vacate in state court is proper where the state 
court lacked jurisdiction. The action the Respondents refer to in 
the bankruptcy court is a complaint for damages for violating the 
automatic stay. The issue in that case is not whether there was 
a violation of the stay but whether the violation was willful and 
what were the damages suffered. The appellant is entitled to the 
relief sought, to have the judgment vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
The controlling facts in this case are the two dates, the 
filing of the bankruptcy and the entry of the judgment. These 
dates are November 21, 1986 and November 28, 1986 respectively. 
These dates are not disputed and are part of the record. Since 
the entry of judgment occurred after the filing of the bankruptcy 
the judgment is void. 
Summary Reversal in this action is appropriate and the 
petition for rehearing should be denied as it does not meet the 
requirements of Rule 35(a) and is meritless. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 
Dated this day of June , 1988 
Ralph L. Walker, pro se 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies 
of the above and foregoing REPLY TO PETITION FOR REHEARING to 
Robert H. Wilde 6925 Union Blvd., Midvale Utah 84947 this day 
of June, 1988. 
Ralph L. Walker 
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